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Abstract 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have been promoted as a 
global set of financial reporting standards that will help integrate global capital 
markets.· We examine whether the mandatory European-wide adoption ofiFRS in 
2005 improved the forecast accuracy for foreign analysts relative to that of 
domestic analysts. We find that, on average, foreign analysts experience no 
incremental improvement in forecast accuracy relative to domestic analysts. 
However, we find that those foreign analysts who are familiar with IFRS do 
experience an incremental improvement in forecast accuracy relative to domestic 
analysts. We also find that this incremental improvement in forecast accuracy 
relative to domestic analysts is concentrated among firms domiciled in countries 
with both strong enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that 
differ significantly from IFRS. Our results highlight that both familiarity with 
IFRS and the quality of countries' enforcement environments play key roles in 
determining the extent to which IFRS adoption can reduce information 
asymmetry between foreign and domestic analysts. 
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1. Introduction 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have emerged in recent years as a 
global set of financial reporting standards. As of 2006, about I 00 countries either required or 
allowed firms to use IFRS for fmancial reporting purposes. Advocates of switching from 
domestic accounting standards to IFRS argue that as a "global set accounting standards" IFRS 
will increase transparency and comparability across countries. In turn, this is expected to lead to 
an increase in cross-border investment, i.e., a decrease in investors' home bias, which should 
increase capital market efficiency and reduce firms' cost of capital. This is the main argument 
advanced by policy-makers advocating IFRS adoption (see Regulation, 2002; Tweedie, 2006). 
As European Union (EU) commissioner for the internal market Char lie McCreevy observed: 
"Clearly, the Financial Services Action Plan to integrate financial markets in 
Europe makes no sense, if investors have to rely on fmancial statements based on 
different local GAAPs. A common accounting standard increases investor 
transparency and comparability. As users become more familiar and confident 
with IFRS, the cost of capital for companies using IFRS should fall. It should lead 
to more efficient capital allocation and greater cross-border investment." 
(McCreevy 2005; p.1) 
The European-wide adoption of IFRS in 2005 represents the largest mandatory adoption of IFRS 
to date. This regulatory change forced over 7,000 public companies based in the 27 member 
countries of the EU to simultaneously switch from their various domestic accounting standards 
to IFRS. 1 We examine a key impact this regulatory change-whether this mandatory adoption 
of IFRS decreased information asymmetry between domestic and foreign analysts. 
A large body of theoretical and empirical research (e.g., Gordon & Bovernberg, 1996; 
Kang & Stulz, 1997; Karolyi & Stulz, 2003; Aherne, Griever, & Warnock, 2004) examines 
investors' home bias, i.e., investors' tendency to invest disproportionately more (less) in 
domestic (foreign) stocks than the optimal asset allocation suggested by standard portfolio 
theory. These studies attribute a significant portion of home bias to domestic investors' 
information advantage over foreign investors arising from domestic investors' better access to 
1 See Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 for details of this regulatory change. 
firm management and local media, and/or their lower information acquisition and processing 
costs. Because mandatory IFRS adoption changes firms' financial reporting practices, one 
primary (if not the only) channel through which IFRS adoption can reduce home bias is by 
reducing domestic investors' information advantage over foreign investors, particularly with 
regard to accounting information. The objective of this paper is to shed light on whether the 
European-wide mandatory adoption ofiFRS reduces domestic investors' information advantage 
over foreign investors with respect to upcoming earnings. To do so, we examine whether 
mandatory IFRS adoption improved the accuracy of foreign analysts' earnings forecasts relative 
to that ofdomestic analysts. 
We focus on financial analysts for a number of reasons. First, financial analysts are 
among the most sophisticated and important users of financial statements who specialize in 
processing and disseminating fmancial information for investors. Second, financial analysts 
explicitly forecast earnings, which allows for a direct measure of the precision of their earnings 
information, i.e., the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. Third, prior studies (see Orpurt, 2004; 
Bae, Stulz, & Tan, 2008a) document that earnings forecasts issued by domestic analysts are more 
accurate than those issued by foreign analysts, indicating that domestic analysts possess an 
information advantage over foreign analysts with respect to earnings. An incremental 
improvement in forecast accuracy for foreign analysts relative to domestic analysts would 
provide direct evidence of a reduction in domestic analysts' information advantage relative to 
foreign analysts. 
Policy-makers argue that mandatory IFRS adoption will expand firms' public disclosures 
and increase comparability by making it easier for investors to compare firms based in different 
countries. Consistent with this expectation, studies show that IFRS are more comprehensive than 
European countries' domestic accounting standards (seeDing, Hope, Jeanjean, & Stolowy 2007; 
Bae, Tan, & Welker 2008b). In this case mandatory IFRS adoption could be expected to decrease 
information asymmetry between domestic and foreign analysts. However, if analysts primarily 
develop their private information from interpreting firms' financial statement disclosures (see 
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Barth, Clinch, and Shibano, 1999), then increasing these disclosures could potentially increase 
the degree of information asymmetry between domestic and foreign analysts. This could arise 
because domestic analysts will likely have better access to other information that can use to 
analyze firms' increased public disclosures, so expanding public disclosures could expand their 
information advantage over foreign analysts. Additionally, prior studies provide mixed evidence 
as to the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on firms' reporting quality. On the one hand, a 
number of studies find evidence of economic effects associated with mandatory IFRS adoption 
that are consistent with an increase in firms' reporting quality; for example, an increase in stock 
liquidity (Daske, Hail, Leuz, & Verdi, 2008) a reduction in firms' cost of capital (Daske et al., 
2008; Li, 2010), and an improvement in firms' information enviromnent (Horton, Serafein, & 
Serafeim, 2008; Byard, Li, & Yu, 2011). On the other hand, a number of studies find evidence 
suggesting that mandatory IFRS adoption lead to a decrease in firms' reporting quality; 
specifically, recent studies find evidence that mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with a 
decrease in firms' earnings quality (Ahmed, Nee!, & Wang 2010; Capkun, Collins, & Jeanjean 
2011). Additionally, any expanded public disclosures provided by IFRS are likely to favor 
foreign analysts who are familiar with IFRS more than those who are unfamiliar with IFRS? 
Thus, foreign analysts' level of familiarity with IFRS will determine the effect of IFRS adoption 
on the degree of information asymmetry between domestic and foreign analysts. Such ability is 
not as important for domestic analysts because domestic analysts have access to alternative 
information sources about upcoming earnings (Cove! & Moskowitz, 1999; Malloy, 2005). 
Second, a number of prior studies show that mandatory IFRS adoption has a larger effect 
(or only effects) firms based in countries where both IFRS adoption represented a relatively large 
change from domestic accounting standards and a high quality enforcement enviromnent ensures 
compliance with IFRS (see Daske et al. al2008; Li 2010; Byard et al. 2010). As a result, we also 
2 Consistent with the importance of such familiarity to financial analysts, Bae et al. (2008a) find that foreign analysts 
located in countries with accounting standards that differ more from the accounting standards used by the firms 
they follow tend to issue less accurate earnings forecasts. Similarly, Bradshaw, Bushee, & Miller (2004) show that 
U.S. institutional investors invest less in non-U.S. firms that use accounting policies that differ more from U.S. 
GAAP. 
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test if any change in information asymmetry between domestic and foreign analysts is larger for 
firms based in such countries (e.g., Germany). 
Our sample includes a constant set of analysts and firms; that is, we examine the same 
analysts following the same set of European-based firms before and after these firms mandatorily 
adopt IFRS. Using a constant sample alleviates concerns that our results are driven by changing 
sample composition. Our sample period includes a pre-adoption period (the last two years firms 
reported in their domestic accounting standards) and a past-adoption period (the first two years 
under IFRS). We hand,collect analyst location data from Nelson' Directory of Investment 
Research. For all analyst-firm pairs, we define domestic (foreign) analysts as those analysts (not) 
located in the same country as the firm being followed. Our sample is comprised of 4,303 
analyst-firm pairs, representing 964 firms followed by 1,132 analysts. Of these 4,303 analyst-
firm pairs, 3,376 (78.5-percent) represent coverage by domestic analysts, while 927 (21.5-
percent) represent .coverage by foreign analysts. We compare the change in forecast accuracy 
from the pre- to past-adoption period across domestic and foreign analysts. 
We find that mandatory IFRS adoption does not result in a change in the degree of 
information asymmetry between domestic analysts and foreign analysts, on average. However, 
when we partition foreign analysts into two groups: a group that is familiar (unfamiliar) with 
IFRS, we find that foreign analysts familiar with IFRS do experience an improvement in forecast 
accuracy relative to domestic analysts; foreign analysts unfamiliar with IFRS experience no such 
incremental improvement. Foreign analysts familiar (unfamiliar) with IFRS are those located in 
countries with domestic accounting standards relatively similar to (different from) IFRS, e.g., the 
UK (Italy). The difference between these two groups of foreign analysts is statistically 
significant. We also find that this improvement in forecast accuracy for those foreign analysts 
familiar with IFRS relative to domestic analysts is attributable to firms based in countries with 
both domestic accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS and strong enforcement 
environments. Finally, while our main analysis uses a cross-sectional analysis, our inferences 
are unchanged if we a within-firm analysis. 
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The mandatory European-wide adoption of IFRS formed part of the EU's Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP), an initiative launched by the EU in the late 1990s aimed at 
integrating the national capital markets of EU member countries into a single capital market and 
harmonizing the functioning of financial intermediaries across the EU. In total, the FSAP 
included 27 different EU directives that had to be transcribed into the laws of each EU member 
state (see Kalemil-Ozcan, Papaioannou, & Peydr6, 2010). The aim of the FSAP was to free the 
movement of capital between the member states of the EU. Our study examine a key effect of 
one part of the FSAP--the mandatory adoption of a single set of financial reporting rules (i.e., 
IFRS) across the member states of the EU.3 
Our study makes a number of contributions. First, we provide new evidence as to the 
impact of mandatory IFRS adoption--specifically, its impact on the degree of information 
asymmetry between domestic and foreign analysts. This is important because the key motive for 
mandatory IFRS adoption is to reduce information asymmetry between domestic and foreign 
market participants and, in the process, to facilitate more cross-border investment. In this since, 
our analysis directly tests a key expectation of policy-makers regarding the possible effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption (see EC Regulation 1601/2002; McCreevy, 2005; Tweedie, 2006). 
While a large number of studies examine various effects arising from mandatory !FRS adoption, 
to date no study provides a .direct test of the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the degree of 
information asymmetry between domestic and foreign market participants. For example, a 
number of prior studies show that analysts' overall information environment improved following 
mandatory IFRS adoption (see Horton et al., 2008; Yang 2010; Beuselinck, Joos, K.hurana, & 
Van der Meulen, 2010; Byard et al. 2011), however, these studies do not compare the change in 
forecast accuracy across domestic and foreign analysts, so these studies do not provide evidence 
as to how mandatory IFRS adoption affects information asymmetry between domestic and 
foreign analysts. Similarly, Tan, Wang, & Welker (2011) show that mandatory IFRS adoption is 
3 While not member states of the EU, Switzerland and Norway also adopted IFRS. 
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associated with an increase in foreign analysts' following and forecast accuracy. Again, 
however, this study does not compare the changes in forecast accuracy across domestic and 
foreign analysts, so this study does not test how mandatory IFRS adoption may have changed the 
degree of information asymmetry between domestic and foreign analysts. 
A number of concurrent studies (Florou & Pope, 2009; Yu, 2010; DeFond, Hu, Hung, & 
Li 2011; Bruggernann, Daske, Homburg, & Pope, 2011) examine changes in investors' cross-
border holdings following mandatory IFRS adoption. These studies find evidence that 
institutional investors (Florou & Pope, 2009), mutual funds (Yu 2010; DeFond et al. 2011), and 
individual investors all increase their holdings of foreign stocks following mandatory IFRS 
adoption4 Our study complements these concurrent studies by providing direct evidence on how 
mandatory IFRS adoption changes domestic analysts' information advantage over foreign 
analysts. The alternative approaches of our study and these concurrent studies each have their 
pros and cons. While changes in institutions' portfolio holdings directly capture institutional 
investors' capital allocation decisions, such changes can also be affected by investment strategies 
unrelated to firm fundamentals, or based on non-accounting information. In contrast, because 
analysts specialize in analyzing frnancial statements and predicting earnings, evidence on the 
change in domestic analysts' information advantage over foreign analysts with respect to future 
earnings is likely attributable to mandatory IFRS adoption rather than to confounding concurrent 
events. Additionally, analyst-based evidence is less likely affected by other regulatory changes 
designed to remove barriers to cross-border investment in Europe, i.e., the adoption of other 
aspects of the FSAP. 
Our results have implications for policy-makers who wish to understand the effect of 
mandatory IFRS adoption on cross-border investment (see EC Regulation 1601/2002; 
McCreevy, 2005). In particular, our results suggest that mandatory IFRS adoption reduces the 
4 Covrig, DeFond, & Hung (2007) find a similar increase in foreing mutual funds' holdings following firms' 
voluntary adoption of !FRS. 
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information disadvantage faced by foreign investors, which in turn should lead to greater cross-
border investment. However, our results also suggest that the adoption benefits of mandatory 
IFRS adoption are uneven across investors and across countries: both investors' familiarity with 
IFRS and country-level enforcement environments play critical roles in determining the extent to 
which mandatory IFRS adoption levels the informational playing field between foreign and 
domestic investors. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section Il develops our hypotheses. Section Ill 
presents our sample selection and study design. Section IV presents the main results, followed by 
Section V with additional analyses. Section VI concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Home Bias and Domestic Analysts' Local Information Advantage 
Home bias is the well-documented phenomenon whereby investors under- (over-) weigh 
their portfolio investments in foreign (domestic) stocks relative to the optimal asset allocation 
determined by standard portfolio theory5 Home bias is costly because it constrains risk sharing 
and results in a higher cost of capital (Lau, Ng, & Zhang, 2010). While regulatory and 
institutional restrictions on international capital flows may contribute to home bias, the primary 
cause is domestic investors' information advantage relative to foreign investors (see Coval & 
Moskowitz, 2001; Aherne et al., 2004; Van Nieuwerburgh & Veldkamp, 2009). Domestic 
investors' infonnation advantage can arise from their better access to local media and firm 
management, their ability to directly observe firms' business activities, their interactions with 
firms' employees and suppliers, or their greater ability to extract useful information from firms' 
financial statements (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999). Facing a higher risk of incurring losses from 
trading against better-informed domestic investors, foreign investors avoid making cross-border 
investments. The link between domestic investors' information advantage and home bias has 
5 See also Karolyi and Stulz (2003) for a review of the home bias literature. 
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been both demonstrated analytically (e.g., Gordon & Bovenberg, 1996) and supported by 
empirical evidence (e.g., Kang & Stulz, 1997; Coval & Moskowitz, 1999; Aherne et al., 2004).6 
Several empirical studies examine domestic analysts' information advantage by 
comparing the accuracy of earnings forecasts by domestic and foreign analysts (i.e., analysts 
located in a different country from the firm covered).7 Orpurt (2004) studies seven European 
countries, and reports that domestic analysts issne more accurate earnings forecasts than foreign 
analysts. Bae et al. (2008b) find similar evidence in a larger sample of 32 countries. 8 
The Information Role of Analysts and the Possible Impact of Mandatory IFRS Adoption 
on Domestic Analysts' Local Information Advantage 
While prior studies show that domestic analysts have an information advantage relative to 
foreign analysts (See Orpurt, 2004; Bae et al., 2008b ), the source of this local information 
advantage is less clear. This is because analysts' private information--the ultimate source of any 
local information advantage--<:an come from different sources depending upon analysts' 
informational role. On the one hand, analysts may develop private information that is a substitute 
for the information provided by firms' financial statements. On the other hand, analysts may 
actually use firms' financial statement disclosures to develop new private information, i.e., 
perform an interpretive information role; in this setting analysts' private information is a 
complement to firm' financial statement disclosures. Prior studies provide evidence that analysts' 
private information can be a substitute for firms' financial disclosures (Shores, 1990; Earth, 
Kasznik, & McNichols 2001) or a complement to firms' financial disclosures (Lang & 
Lundholm 1996; Barron, Byard, & Kim, 2002; Frankel, Kothari, & Weber, 2006). Chen, Cheng, 
& Lo (20 10) provide evidence that analysts' forecasts fulfill both information roles. 
6 Even when investing in foreign firms, investors still have a preference for firms with a presence in their home 
country. Ke, Ng, & Wang (2010) show that non-US mutual funds are more likely to invest in US firms that have a 
presence in the countries where these non-US funds are based. 
7 Another strand of research compares the investment performance of domestic investors with that of foreign 
investors (see Bae et al., 2008a for a discussion). 
8 Malloy (2005) uses U.S. data to examine whether an analyst's physical distance from a firm affects forecast 
accuracy. He finds that analysts located closer to a firm provide more accurate earnings forecasts. 
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IFRS are more comprehensive and more capital market orientated than European 
countries' domestic accounting standards (Ding et al., 2007; Bae et al., 2008b). Thus, the switch 
from domestic European accounting standards to !FRS can be expected to increase the amount of 
public disclosures provided by European firms. If analysts primarily develop their private 
information from non-accounting sources (e.g., access to management, local media) that are an 
alternative to firm's financial -statement disclosures, i.e., they mainly perform a substitutive 
informational role, then the increase in public disclosures could be expected decrease domestic 
analysts' local information advantage. This can be expected because the increased public 
disclosures will substitute for analysts' (alternative) private information sources that favor 
domestic analysts over foreign analysts. In this setting the new information analysts derive from 
the expanded financial disclosures or enhanced comparability of !FRS serves as a substitute for 
alternative information sources that typically favor domestic analysts, so mandatory !FRS 
adoption can be expected to reduce information asymmetry between domestic and foreign 
analysts (e.g., Verrecchia, 1982; Lundholm, 1991; Bushman & Smith, 2001). 
On the other hand, if analysts primarily develop their private information from their 
analysis of firms' financial statement disclosures, i.e., they mainly fulfill a complementary 
informational role (see Kim and Verrecchia 1994; Barron et al., 2002), then an increase in firms' 
public disclosures may actually increase domestic analysts' local information advantage. This 
can arise because in this setting an increase in public disclosures will provide analysts with more 
"raw material" with which to develop their own unique insights or interpretations. If the local 
knowledge that analysts use to analyze firms' financial statement disclosures favors domestic 
analysts over foreign analysts, then, potentially, an increase in public disclosures could actually 
increase domestic analysts' information advantage over foreign analysts (see Kim and 
Verrecchia, 1994; Barth, Clinch, & Shibano, 1999). In summary, while policy-makers argue that 
mandatory !FRS adoption will increase firms' disclosures and comparability and, thus, result in a 
decrease in information asymmetry between domestic and foreign market participants, the prior 
theoretical and empirical evidence in the case of financial analysts is less clear cut. 
9 
Hypotheses Development 
A large number of studies examine various effects associated with mandatory IFRS 
adoption. While policy-makers argue that mandatory IFRS adoption will improve firms' 
reporting quality, the results of these studies are mixed. On the one hand, consistent with an 
increase in firms' reporting quality, a number of studies find evidence of positive economic 
effects associated with mandatory IFRS adoption, such as an increase in stock liquidity (Daske et 
al., 2008), a decrease in firms' cost of capital (Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010), an improvement in 
firms' overall information enviromnent (Horton et al., 2008; Yang, 2010; Beuse1inck, et al., 
2010; Byard et al., 2011), an increase in foreign analysts' following and forecast accuracy (Tan, 
et al., 2011), an increase in stock price informativeness (Beuselinck, Joos, Khurana, & Van der 
Meulen, 2009), and an increase in the information content of firms' earnings announcements 
(Landsman, Maydew, & Thornock, 2011). 
On the other hand, a number of studies find evidence suggesting that firms' reporting 
quality decreases after firms are forced to switch from using domestic accounting standards to 
IFRS. Specifically, these studies find that mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with a decrease 
in firms' earnings quality (see Christensen, Lee, & Walker, 2008; Ahmed et al., 2010; Capkun, et 
al., 2011). Moreover, this evidence of a decrease in earnings quality is not entirely unexpected. 
Each country's domestic accounting standards evolved in conjunction with, and as an integral 
part of, the country's institutional setting. Domestic accounting standards may thus provide a 
better "institutional fit" with firms' local institutional setting than the "once size fits all" of a 
global set of reporting standards like IFRS (Ball, 2006). Compared to domestic accounting 
standards, IFRS may be ill-suited to some firms or some enviromnents and, thus, forcing firms to 
adopt IFRS may result in a decrease in reporting quality. 
Additionally, a key argument of proponents of mandatory IFRS adoption is that a 
common set of "global accounting standards" will increase the comparability of investment 
opportunities across countries, resulting in an improve transparency and capital allocation (e.g., 
see Regulation, 2002; Me McCreevy 2005). Using different approaches to measuring 
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comparability, a number of recent studies directly test whether mandatory !FRS adoption 
improves comparability across firms based in different countries. The inferences from these 
studies are mixed, however. Consistent with an increase in comparability, studies find that 
mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in "information transfer" between firms 
based in different countries (Wang, 2011), a larger increase in foreign mutual fund holdings 
when there is a greater increase in the number of firms using the same set of accounting 
standards, i.e., IFRS (DeFond, et al., 2011), and an increase in firms' "accounting comparability" 
(Lang, Maffett, & Owens, 201 0). However, Lang et al. (20 1 0) also find that mandatory IFRS 
adoption increases firms' earnings comovement which actually decreases the quality of firms' 
information environment. It is thus unclear if firms actually benefit from improved comparability 
following mandatory IFRS adoption. 
In summary, while policy-makers argue that switching from domestic standards to IFRS 
will enhance firm disclosures and increase comparability (EC Regulation No. 1606/2002) the 
evidence to date is mixed. As a result, our first hypothesis, stated in the null, is that mandatory 
IFRS adoption will result in not change in the degree of information asymmetry between foreign 
and domestic analysts: 
HI: Ceteris paribus, the mandatory European-wide adoption of IFRS did not improve 
the forecast accuracy for foreign analysts relative to that of domestic analysts. 
The effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the degree of information asymmetry between 
domestic and foreign analysts is likely to vary across firms. Two factors are critical in 
determining whether IFRS adoption results in an actual change in firms' financial reporting 
practices. First, the degree of change from countries' domestic accounting standards to IFRS is 
critical. Some countries (e.g., Germany) have domestic accounting standards that are quite 
different from IFRS, whereas other countries have domestic accounting standards that are quite 
similar to IFRS (e.g., the U.K.). Mandatory IFRS adoption should have little effect on firms 
domiciled in countries where the domestic accounting standards are similar to IFRS (e.g., the 
UK). 
11 
Second, the quality of countries' enforcement environments will also critically determine 
the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption. Merely mandating IFRS does not guarantee material 
changes in firms' actual reporting practices (Ball, 2006). Firms actual reporting practices are 
shaped by firms' financial reporting incentives which are determined by firms' institutional 
environment (e.g., Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000, 2003; Leuz, 2003; Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz 
2006; Lang, Ready, & Wilson, 2006). The quality of the enforcement environment plays a key 
role in determining firms' compliance with accounting standards (e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Leuz, 
Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Holthausen, 2009). Mandatory IFRS 
adoption may only have an effect in those countries with high quality enforcement environments 
which ensure rigorous implementation of the enhanced disclosure requirement ofiFRS. 
In the case of mandatory IFRS adoption, prior studies find that the increase in stock 
liquidity (Daske et al., 2008), decrease in firms' cost of capital (Daske et al., 2008; Li, 201 0), and 
improvement in firms' information environment (Byard et al., 2011) are all concentrated among 
firms based in countries with both relatively large differences between domestic accounting 
standards and IFRS and strong enforcement environments (e.g., Germany).9 Following these 
studies, we test if any change in information asymmetry between domestic analysts and foreign 
analysts is also concentrated among firms based in countries with both domestic accounting 
standards that are relatively different from IFRS (so firms experience a relatively large increase 
in reporting requirements as a result of IFRS adoption) and high quality enforcement 
environments. Our third hypothesis, stated in the null, is: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the information 
asymmetry between domestic and foreing analysts is greater for firms domiciled 
in countries with both strong enforcement regimes and domestic accounting 
standards that differ significantly from JFRS than for firms based in other 
countries. 
9 However, as long as financial reporting standards allow for discretion and firms have differing reporting 
incentives; strong enforcement will not eliminate all variations in reporting quality across finns (Leuz, 2006). 
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To test H1 and H2 we undertake two tests. First, we compare the change in forecast 
accuracy across domestic analysts and all foreign analysts. Second, as a more powerful test, we 
also compare the change in forecast accuracy between domestic analysts and only those foreign 
analysts who are likely to be familiar with IFRS (because these foreign analysts are based in a 
country with domestic accounting standards that are similar to IFRS, e.g., the U.K.). 10 
If mandatory IFRS adoption is to reduce domestic analysts' information advantage over 
foreign analysts, then foreign analysts must be able to extract useful information from the 
expanded disclosures or enhanced comparability provided by IFRS-based financial statements. If 
some of analysts' private information comes from their analysis of firms' fmancial statement 
disclosures (see Barth et al., 1999) then, clearly, a familiarity with firms' financial reporting 
standards will be critical. This suggest that foreign analysts who are more familiar with IFRS 
will better able to analyze IFRS fmancial statements and, as a result, should benefit relatively 
more (than other foreign analysts) from mandatory IFRS adoption. 11 
3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample Selection 
European firms subject to mandatory IFRS adoption were required to switch to IFRS for 
fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2005. Our sample period spans two reporting 
regimes: a pre-adoption period (i.e., the last two fiscal years when a firm reported in its domestic 
accounting standards) and a post-adoption period (i.e., the first two fiscal years when a firm 
10 Compared with foreign analysts, domestic analysts typically have greater access to alternative information sources 
that can serve as substitutes for accounting disclosures, so familiarity with IFRS is less likely to affect domestic 
analysts' earnings information. 
11 Consistent with the importance of analysts' familiarity with firms' accounting standards, Bae et al. (2008a) 
provide evidence that more accurate earnings forecasts are issued by foreign analysts whose home-country 
accounting standards differ less from the finn's home-country accounting standards. Prior studies also show that a 
lack of familiarity with foreign accounting standards affects investors' investment decisions. Bradshaw et al. 
(2004) find that U.S. institutional investment is higher in non-U.S. firms that use a greater number of accounting 
methods that conform with U.S. accounting standards (i.e., GAAP). Aggarwal, Klapper, & Wysocki (2005) find 
that U .S. mutual funds invest more in firms from emerging markets when these firms are based in countries with 
better accounting standards, or when the firms are listed as an American Deposit Receipt (ADR). Similarly, Yu 
(20 11) shows that mutual funds are less likely to invest in firms based in countries with accounting standards that 
are relatively more different from the accounting standards of the country the mutual fund is based in. 
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reported in !FRS). For example, for a December year-end firm, the pre-adoption period includes 
fiscal years 2003 and 2004, while the post-adoption period includes fiscal years 2005 and 2006. 
We begin by using the IBES international (split unadjusted) database to identify all 
European firms that have at least one analyst who issues annual earnings forecasts for the same 
firm during both the two-year pre-adoption period and the two-year post-adoption period. 12 For 
each analyst-firm pair, we retrieve all of the analyst's annual earnings forecasts issued during the 
twelve-month period prior to each year-end, and retain only the last forecast if the analyst issued 
more than one forecast for that year. We also require that annual earnings announcements be 
made no later than 240 calendar days after the fiscal year-end. This sample selection criteria 
results in a constant set of analysts forecasting earnings for the same set of European firms under 
two different reporting regimes, where each analyst issued at least one earnings forecast for the 
same firm in both the pre- and post-adoption periods. 
Some European firms voluntarily adopted !FRS prior to the mandatory European-wide 
adoption of !FRS in 2005. We exclude these firms from our sample so that our sample focuses 
exclusively on. European firms that were forced to adopt !FRS in 2005 as a result of the 
European-wide mandatory adoption of !FRS. We use both the Global Compustat and 
Datastream!W orldscope databases to retrieve data for firms' accounting standards. If these two 
databases provide conflicting data as to which accounting standards a firm used in a particular 
year, we hand-checked the auditor's report in the firm's annual report for that year. To mitigate 
confounding factors, we also eliminate firms that were cross-listed as American Deposit Receipts 
(ADRs) and firms that changed their country of domicile or primary exchange listing during the 
sample period. 13 This results in a sample of 1, 168 European-based mandatory !FRS adapters that 
are followed by a constant set of 2,819 unique analysts. 
12 Our sample includes EU member countries, as well as two non-member countries: Norway and Switzerland. Both 
of these countries adopt many EU regulations, including mandatory !FRS adoption (see Daske et al., 2008; 
Annstrong, et al., 201 0). Our results are robust to excluding those two countries. 
13 Non-U.S. firms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges as ADRs were required to reconcile their non-U.S. GAAP 
financial statements with U.S. GAAP during our sample period. We identify these firms using ADR databases 
from the Bank of New York and Citibank. 
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For each analyst-firm pair, we classify the analyst as "domestic" or "foreign" with respect 
to the firm she follows. If the analyst is based in the same country as (a different country from) 
the firm, we classify the analyst as "domestic" ("foreign"). Since analysts' country locations are 
not available in any electronic database, we hand-collect this information for our four-year 
sample period. Specifically, we first retrieve from the IDES database the names of all analysts in 
our sample and the names of their brokerage firms. We then hand-match these analysts with 
Nelson's Directory of Investment Research, and retain only those analysts where we are able to 
match both the analyst's name and the brokerage firm's name. For the matched analysts, we 
hand-collect their business location from Nelson's Directory of .(nvestment Research, which lists 
analysts' primary business location as of November of each year. We classify an analyst's 
location for year t based upon information from Nelson's Directory for year t-1. Using this 
approach, we are able to identify the primary business location of 1,132 analysts. Our final 
sample consists of 4,303 analyst-firm observations, representing 1,132 analysts and 964 firms. 
<Insert Table 1 About Here> 
In Table 1, the first two columns present the country distributions of the 964 firms and 
1,132 analysts represented in our final sample. The firms are domiciled in over 20 European 
countries, with heavy concentrations in the UK (339 firms, 35.17-percent of the sample), France 
(148 firms, 15.35-percent of the sample), and Italy (83 firms, 8.61-percent of the sample). The 
majority of analysts are also located in Europe, with heavy concentrations in the UK (35.25-
percent), France (15.72-percent), and Germany (10.51-percent). 14 
Of the 4,303 analyst-firm pairs in our sample, 3,376 (78.5-percent) represent pairs where 
the analyst is located in the same country as the firm (i.e., a domestic analyst), while 927 (21.5-
percent) pairs represent cases where the analyst is located in a different country from the firm 
(i.e., a foreign analyst). The greater prevalence of domestic analysts is consistent with prior 
research which suggests that analysts mainly follow domestic firms (Bae et al., 2008a). Of the 
14 Our results are robust to excluding the small number of analysts located in non-European countries (e.g., the 
United States and South Africa). 
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964 firms in our sample, only 255 firms are followed by both domestic and foreign analysts. 
Following Orpurt (2004) and Bae et al. (2008b ), we conduct our main analyses using cross-
sectional tests, where we use all available observations to compare domestic and foreign 
analysts. Then, in further analysis (see Section V), we conduct within-firm comparisons of 
domestic and foreign analysts using the 255 firms followed by both domestic and foreign 
analysts. 
Testing the Average Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption (Hl) 
For each analyst-firm pair, we calculate the change in the analyst's forecast accuracy 
between the pre- and post-adoption periods. Specifically, similar to Duru and Reeb (2002), we 
first calculate analyst i's forecast accuracy for firm} in year t (ACCURACYyt) as the negative of 
the analyst's price-scaled absolute forecast error: ACCURACYyr = - (I Actua/11 - Forecastyrf I 
Stock Price1,), where Actua~1 is the actual annual EPS from the IBES database for fmn j in year t; 
Forecasty1 is analyst i's earnings forecast for firm} in year t; and Stock PriceJI is the stock price 
of firm} at the beginning of year t. We then calculate analyst i's average accuracy for firm} in 
the pre- and post-adoption periods, respectively. The change in analyst i's average forecast 
accuracy for firm} (MCCURACYy) is the difference in analyst i's average forecast accuracy for 
firm} between the pre- and post-adoption periods. 
To compare the change in forecast accuracy across domestic and foreign analysts, we 
create an indicator variable (FOREIGNy) to differentiate between domestic and foreign analysts: 
FOREIGNy equals one (zero) if analyst i is a foreign (domestic) analyst for firm}. We test Hl 
by estimating the following model: 
MCCURACY, = a 0 + a 1FOREIGNy + a 2 MogSIZFy + a3MogFOLLO~ 
+ a 4 MogHORIZOJ{ + <, . (1) 
H 1 predicts that mandatory IFRS adoption is associated with an incremental increase in forecast 
accuracy for foreign analysts relative to domestic analysts, i.e., a1 > 0. 
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As a second more powerful test of HI, we split foreign analysts into two groups, those 
familiar with !FRS (FORIGN FAMILIAR) and those unfamiliar with !FRS 
(FORIGN_UNFAMILIAR). We base this categorization of foreign analysts on the degree of 
similarity between the accounting standards of the foreign analyst's home country and IFRS (see 
discussion below). Accordingly, for our second test ofHl, we create two dummy variables to 
identify these two different types of foreign analysts: FOREIGN_FAMILIARy equals 1 if analyst 
i following firm j is a foreign analyst who is familiar with !FRS, and 0 otherwise; on the other 
hand, FOREIGN_ UNFAMILIARy equals 1 if analyst i following firmj is a foreign analyst who is 
unfamiliar with !FRS, and 0 otherwise. To test H2, we estimate the following model: 
t.ACCURACY" = /30 + f3,FOREIGN_FAMILIA~ + f3 2FOREIGN_UNFAMILIA!J 
+ f33ALogSIZ~ + f34ALogFOLLO~ + f3 5ALogHORIZOJ>i + '" (2) 
where the subscript i refers to analyst i and the subscript j refers to firm j. The control variables 
are the same as in Equation ( 1 ). A significantly positive /31 (fh) indicates a significant 
incremental improvement in forecast accuracy relative to domestic analysts for those foreign 
analysts who are familiar (unfamiliar) with !FRS. We expect that fJ1 > {J2• 
To define FORIGNJAMILIAR and FORING_UNFAMILIAR we assume that analysts 
based in countries with accounting standards that are relatively similar to (different from) !FRS 
are in familiar (unfamiliar). To measure the difference between a country's accounting standards 
and !FRS, we use the gaapdiffl measure of Bae et al. (2008a, Table 1 ). This is a comprehensive 
measure designed to capture differences between a country's domestic accounting standards and 
IFRS along 21 key accounting items15 We re-label this measure LIACC to emphasize that this 
measure captures the degree of difference between countries domestic accounting standards and 
!FRS. Table 1, Column 3 presents LIACC scores for the home countries of all the analysts in our 
sample. Higher values of LIACC indicate greater differences between a country's accounting 
15 Bae et al.'s (2008) metric is more up-to-date and comprehensive than some alternative measures (see Ashbaugh 
& Pincus, 2001; Hung, 2001; Ding et al., 2007). For example, the Ashbaugh and Pincus' (2001) index is based on 
IAS standards prior to 1994, while the Hung (2001) index focuses only on differences in the use of accrual 
accounting. Similarly, the alternative index of Ding et al. (2007) are not available for all the EU member 
countries in our sample. Bae et al.'s measure is also adopted by Daske et al. (2008) and Byard et al. (2011). 
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standards and IFRS. For the analysts' home-countries in our sample, MCC scores range from 1 
(the UK) to 18 (Luxembourg), with a median value of 11. 16 Foreign analysts familiar 
(unfamiliar) with !FRS are those analysts based in countries with domestic accounting standards 
relatively similar to (different from) !FRS, i.e., MCC < 11 (MCC "' 11). 
Following Byard et al. (2011), we include three control variables in Equations (I) and 
(2): the change in firm size (i.e., MagSIZEj); the change in the number of analysts following a 
firm (MagFOLLOffj); and the change in each analysts' forecast horizon (MagHORIZONij). 
Forecast horizon is the number of days between the forecast issue date and the earnings 
announcement date. Since Equations (1) and (2) are a change regression, the three control 
variables are also in change forms. We control for the change in analysts' forecast horizon, 
because earnings forecasts made closer to earnings announcement dates tend to be more accurate 
(e.g., Clement, 1999). 
To measure the change in firm size for firmj, we first calculate the beginning-of-the-year 
market capitalization in U.S. dollars (using the exchange rate in effect at the beginning of the 
year) for each of the four sample years, and then calculate MagSJZEj as the difference in the log 
of average market capitalization between the pre- and past-adoption periods for firm j. We 
calculate the number of analysts following a firm as the total number of analysts who forecast 
earnings for a firm, not just the constant set of analysts who follow the firm in both the pre- and-
post-adoption periods in our sample. MagFOLLOffj is the change in the log of the average 
number of analysts following fmnj between the pre- and past-adoption period. To calculate the 
16 This approach assumes that analysts are primarily familiar with their domestic accounting standards; as a result, 
analysts based in countries with accounting standards more similar to IFRS should be more familiar with IFRS-
type reporting. This assumption is reasonable because the majority of firms that analysts follow are domestic 
firms, and analysts rarely change their country location (Bae et al., 2008a). In our sample, over 80% of firms 
followed by a typical analyst are domestic firms. An alternative measure of a foreign analyst's familiarity with 
IFRS is the percentage of firms in the analyst's portfolio that use IFRS in the pre-adoption period. We do not use 
this alternative measure, because it ignores important country-level differences in accounting standards. For 
example, a German analyst and aUK analyst can have the same portfolio composition (e.g., 90% domestic firms 
and 10% firms that use IFRS) in the pre-adoption period, but substantially different expertise in analyzing IFRS-
based financial statements. The UK analyst likely is more familiar with IFRS-type reporting than the German 
analyst, because UK accounting standards are very similar to IFRS while German accounting standards are 
significantly different from !FRS (see Table 1). 
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change in analyst l's forecast horizon for firmj, we first calculate an analyst's average forecast 
horizon for the pre- and post-adoption periods, respectively, and calculate t.LogHORIZONif as 
the difference in the log of average horizon between the two periods. 
Testing the Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption Conditional on Country-level Institutional 
Characteristics (H2) 
To test H2, we first identify firms likely to experience the most significant increase in 
disclosures and comparability following mandatory IFRS adoption, i.e., firms domiciled in 
countries with both domestic accounting standards that are substantially different from IFRS and 
strong legal enforcement environments. Consistent with prior research (Daske et al., 2008; 
Byard et al., 2011), we use the 2005 value ofKaufmann et al.'s (2007) "rule oflaw" variable to 
capture the quality of countries' enforcement environments, denoted ENFORCE. 17 Column 4 of 
Table 1 shows the values of ENFORCE for the countries of domicile of our sample firms. Higher 
values of ENFORCE represent countries with stronger legal and enforcement environments. It is 
well known that EU countries vary substantially in their economic and political institutions, 
including enforcement regimes (Ball, 2006). In our sample, the minimum (maximum) value of 
ENFORCE is 0.3 (2.0) for Poland (Switzerland), with a sample median of 1.6. As discussed 
above, we use LIA CC to measure the extent to which a country's domestic accounting standards 
differ from IFRS (Column 3 of Table 1). The median value of LIACC for the countries of 
domicile of our sample firms is 1118 
We partition our sample of 964 European firms in our sample into country groups based 
on whether the values of LIACC and ENFORCE for a firm's country of domicile exceed the 
median values of these two variables for our sample. This partitioning divides our sample into 
17 Our results are robust to using the following alternative proxies for ENFORCE: (1) the Kaufmann et al. (2007) 
"rule oflaw" score for 2004, 2005, 2006, or the average of the three years from 2004 to 2006; (2) the "governance 
effectiveness" score, the "regulatory quality" score, or the average of six governance scores for 2005 from 
Kaufmann et al. (2007); or (3) the mean of the three law enforcement variables from La Porta et al. (1998), as 
used by Leuz et al. (2003). 
18 Table I, Column 3 presents the MCC scores for all countries in our sample, including firms' countries of 
domicile and analysts' home countries. Note that 11 is the median value for each of these two different country 
samples: the sample of all firms' countries of domicile, and the sample of all analysts' home countries. 
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three country groups of firms: (1) a High-High (HH) group that includes firms domiciled in 
countries with strong enforcement and domestic accounting standards that differ considerably 
from IFRS (ENFORCE?:. 1.6 and MCC ?:. 11); (2) a High-Low (HL) group that includes firms 
domiciled in countries with strong enforcement and domestic accounting standards that are 
relatively similar to IFRS (ENFORCE?:. 1.6 and MCC < 11); and (3) a Low-High (LH) group 
that includes firms domiciled in countries with weak enforcement and domestic accounting 
standards that differ considerably from IFRS (ENFORCE < 1.6 and MCC ?:. 11). For our 
sample, no country has below-median values for both ENFORCE and MCC (i.e., ENFORCE< 
1.6 and MCC< 11). 
Of the 964 sample firms, 100 firms are domiciled in High-High country group, 365 firms 
are domiciled in Low-High country group, and the remaining 499 firms are domiciled in High-
Low country group. H3 predicts that the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption will be strongest for 
firms based in the High-High country group. That is to say, H3 predicts that the improvement 
foreign analysts' forecast accuracy relative to domestic analysts for foreing analsyts who are 
familiar with IFRS (i.e., fJ1) is larger for firms based in the High-High group of countries than for 
the other two groups of countries. The High-High group includes firms based in Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Germany, and Switzerland. 19 To test H2, we re-estimate 
Equations (1) and (2) separately for each of these three country groups. 
4. RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for our constant analyst-firm sample across the pre-
and post-adoption periods. In the pre-adoption period, average forecast accuracy is higher for 
domestic analysts (-0.026) than for foreign analysts (-0.030); the difference is also statistically 
19 The Low-High group (Low ENFORCE, High L!ACC) includes firms based in: Belgium, the Czech Republic, 
France, Greece, Hungry, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain. The High-Low group (High ENFORCE, Low L!ACC) 
includes finns based in: Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
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significant (p<0.05, two-tailed; untabulated). This result confirms the prior finding that domestic 
analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts than foreign analysts (e.g., Bae et al., 2008a). 
For all analysts, the mean (median) level of forecast accuracy increases from -0.028 
( -0.012) in the pre-adoption period to -0.017 (-0.007) in the post-adoption period; this increase is 
statistically significant (p<O.Ol, two-tailed, for both a t-test and a signrank test). We further 
partition analysts into four groups: domestic analysts, all foreign analysts, the subsample of 
foreign analysts who are familiar with IFRS, and the subsample of foreign analysts who are 
unfamiliar with IFRS. The results indicate an improvement in forecast accuracy for all four 
groups of analysts. 
Table 2 also compares the change in forecast accuracy (MCCURACY) across these 
different groups of analysts. Based on a ranksum test, forecast accuracy increases more for 
foreign analysts than for domestic analysts (p<O.OOl, two-tailed). Further, we compare 
MCCURACY across domestic analysts and the two subsets of foreign analysts (foreign analysts 
familiar with IFRS, and foreign analysts unfamiliar with IFRS). We fmd that only foreign 
analysts familiar with IFRS experience a greater improvement in forecast accuracy than domestic 
analysts (p<0.001, two-tailed, for a ranksum test), while the improvement in forecast accuracy 
for foreign analysts unfamiliar with IFRS is not statistically different from that for domestic 
analysts. Overall, the results from these univariate comparisons provide some preliminary 
evidence in support of our first two hypotheses. However, these univariate tests should be 
interpreted with caution as they do not control for other variables that potentially affect the 
change in forecast accuracy (e.g., changes in forecast horizons). 
Finally, Table 2 also presents summary statistics for the levels of the three control 
variables in Equations (1) to (2)-LogFOLLOW, LogSIZE, and LogHORIZON--for both the 
pre- and post-adoption periods. The univariate comparisons confirm that all three control 
variables increase significantly between the pre- and post-adoption periods (p<0.01, two-tailed, 
for all). These results highlight the importance of controlling for the changes in these variables 
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when examinillg the effect of mandatory IFRS adoption on the change in analysts' forecast 
accuracy. 
<Insert Table 2 About Here> 
The Results of Testing the Average Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption (Hl) 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating Equations (I) and (2) using our entire sample of 
4,303 analyst-firm observations. We cluster on firms to adjust for heteroskedasticity and 
correlation for observations for the same firm (Rogers, 1993). The estimate of Equation (I) 
shows that the coefficient on FOREIGN is positive (0.0024) but not statistically significant at 
conventional levels (one-tailedp=O.l56, two-tailed). Thus, we find no evidence that mandatory 
IFRS adoption is associated with an improvement in forecast accuracy of all foreign analysts 
relative to domestic analysts. 
However, in our estimate of Equation (2), we find that the coefficient on 
FOREIGN_FAMILIAR is positive and statistically significant (0.0041, two-tailed p=0.020), 
indicating a significant incremental improvement in forecast accuracy for foreign analysts 
familiar with IFRS relative to domestic analysts. In contrast, the change in forecast accuracy 
does not differ between foreign analysts unfamiliar with !FRS and domestic analysts: the 
coefficient on FOREIGN UNFAMILIAR is not statistically different from zero (0.0002, two-
tailed p=0.913). Thus, consistent with Hl, our evidence indicates that mandatory !FRS adoption 
does reduce the information advantage of domestic analysts over foreign analysts, but only for 
the sub-set of foreign analysts who are familiar with !FRS. We also compare the coefficients on 
FOREIGN_FAMILAR andFOREIGN_UNFAMILAR: the coefficient on FOREIGN_FAMILAR is 
significantly greater than that for FOREIGN_UNFAMILAR (one-tailedp=0.027). Our evidence 
thus suggests that mandatory !FRS adoption reduces domestic analysts' information advantage 
over foreign analysts to a greater degree when foreign analysts are more familiar with !FRS. 
<Insert Table 3 About Here> 
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The results for the control variables are largely consistent with prior research. In the 
estimate of Equation (I) the coefficient on .tJ.LogSIZE is significantly positive (0.0150, two-tailed 
p=O.Ol8), indicating that forecast accuracy improves when firm size increases. The coefficient 
on .tJ.LogHORJZON is significantly negative ( -0.0039, two-tailed p=0.002), indicating that 
forecast accuracy decreases as forecast horizon increases (i.e., an increase in the number of days 
between the forecast issue date and the earnings announcement date). 
The Results of Testing the Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption Conditional on Countries' 
Institution Characteristics (H2) 
To test H2 we partition our sample of 964 European mandatory adopters into three 
country-groups - High-High, High-Low, and Low-High - based on two country-level 
institutional characteristics: the strength of legal enforcement (ENFORCE) and the difference 
between domestic accounting standards and IFRS, i.e., the degree of change in accounting 
standards when firms switch from reporting in domestic accounting standards to reporting in 
!FRS (M CC). Table 4 reports the results ofestimating Equations (1) and (2) separately for these 
three country groups of firms. We find that the earlier for Hl for the subset of foreign analysts 
familiar with IFRS (reported in Table 3 above) are driven by the High-High group - the 
coefficient on FOREIGN_FAMILIAR is significantly positive for the High-High group, but not 
for other two groups. That is, foreign analysts familiar with IFRS experience an improvement in 
forecast accuracy relative to domestic analysts only for firms based in High-High countries; 
these are the firms most likely to implement substantial changes to their financial reporting 
practices following mandatory IFRS adoption. 
For the High-High group, while the coefficient on FOREIGN _FAMILIAR is significantly 
positive (0.0018, two-tailed p=0.036), the coefficient on FOREIGN_UNFAMILIAR is 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that, in the High-High countries, foreign analysts familiar 
with IFRS experience an incremental improvement in forecast accuracy relative to domestic 
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analysts; however, such an incremental improvement in forecast accuracy does not exist for 
foreign analysts unfamiliar with IFRS. 
< Insert Table 4 About Here > 
To test H2 formally, we estimate Equation (2) for all three country groups in a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) system, and test the difference in coefficients across the three 
groups. The bottom of Table 4 presents the results comparing the coefficient on 
FOREIGN FAMILIAR across the three country groups. We fmd that the coefficient on 
FOREIGN_FAMILIAR for the High-High group is significantly greater than that for either the 
High-Low or Low-High group (one-tailed p=0.069 and 0.030, respectively). These results also 
support H3 that the adoption effect is greater for firms domiciled in countries with strong 
enforcement and accounting standards that differ considerably from IFRS, i.e., the High-High 
group, than for firms domiciled the High-Low or Low-High group. 
Overall, the results indicate that the incremental improvement m forecast accuracy 
relative to domestic analysts for those foreign analysts familiar with IFRS is concentrated among 
firms domiciled in the High-High countries. These findings are consistent with recent evidence 
that mandatory IFRS adoption is more likely to result in substantial changes in financial 
reporting for firms domiciled in countries with stronger enforcement environments and domestic 
accounting standards that differ more from IFRS (e.g., Daske et al., 2008; Byard et al., 2011; Li, 
2010). 
5. FURTHER ANALYSIS USING A WITHIN-FIRM DESIGN 
Our results in Section 4 are based on cross-sectional tests companng domestic and 
foreign analysts. In this section, we investigate the robustness of these results to within-firm 
comparisons of domestic and foreign analysts. The cross-sectional and within-firm tests each 
have their strengths and weaknesses. The cross-sectional tests have more power because they 
utilize all available observations. However, since not every firm is followed by both domestic 
and foreign analysts, domestic and foreign analysts are not always compared within the same 
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firms. As a result, the fmdings can be confounded by differences in firms that attract different 
types of analyst following. The within-firm matching of domestic and foreign analysts controls 
for differences in firm characteristics, but has lower test power due to the smaller sample size. 
For the within-firm analyses, we retain ouly firms that are followed by at least one 
domestic analyst and at least one foreign analyst. This results in a sample of 255 firms. If a firm 
has more than one domestic analyst, we take the average of the change in forecast accuracy 
(MCCURACY) across all domestic analysts; similarly, we also average across all foreign 
analysts. This procedure avoids giving undue weight to firms followed by a larger number of 
analysts. Then, for each firm, we compute the difference in the change in forecast accuracy 
between foreign and domestic analysts, i.e., DJFF_MCCURACY = (MCCURACY for foreign 
analysts - MCCURACY for domestic analysts). Note there are 255 observations for 
DIFF_MCCURACY, one for each firm. 
<Insert Table 5 About Here> 
The results are reported in Table 5. Cell (A, I) compares domestic and foreign analysts for 
all 255 firms. The mean of DJFF _ MCCURACY is 0.002, statistically positive at p<O.IO, one-
tailed; the median is 0.000 and not statistically significant. Thus, the results provide some 
support for HI that foreign analysts experience an improvement in forecast accuracy relative to 
domestic analysts. 
Cell (B,l) compares domestic analysts with foreign analysts familiar with IFRS. To 
conduct this test, we retain only firms that are followed by at least one domestic analyst and at 
least one foreign analyst familiar with IFRS, which results in a sample of 184 firms 2° For this 
test, we measure DIFF_MCCURACY as: LlACCURACYusing forecasts by only those foreign 
analysts familiar with IFRS - MCCURACY for domestic analysts. Similarly, Cell (C,l) 
compares domestic analysts with foreign analysts who are unfamiliar with IFRS using the 159 
20 Of the 255 firms followed by both domestic and foreign analysts, 96 firms are followed only by domestic analysts 
and foreign analysts who are familiar with IFRS, 71 firms are followed only by domestic analysts and foreign 
analysts unfamiliar with IFRS, and the remaining 88 firms are followed by all three analyst groups: domestic 
analysts, foreign analysts familiar with IFRS, and foreign analysts unfamiliar with IFRS. Thus, we have 184 
(~96+88) firms in Row B, and we have 159 (~71+88) firms in Row C. 
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firms with at least one domestic analyst and at least one foreign analyst unfamiliar with IFRS. 
For this test, we measure DIFF_MCCURACY as: MCCURACYusing forecasts by only those 
foreign analysts unfamiliar with IFRS - MCCURA CY for domestic analysts. 
The results are consistent with the earlier results reported in Tables 3 and 4. Cell (B,l) 
shows that for foreign analysts familiar with IFRS, mean (median) of DIFF_MCCURACY is 
0.005 (0.001), significantly greater than zero at the 0.01 (0.01) level, one-tailed, indicating that 
foreign analysts familiar with IFRS experience an improvement in forecast accuracy relative to 
domestic analysts. In contrast, Cell (C,l) shows no evidence of a difference in the change in 
forecast accuracy· between foreign analysts unfamiliar with IFRS and domestic analysts, 
Consistent with H2, DIFF_MCCURACY is significantly more positive in Cell (B,l) than in Cell 
(C,l), as shown at the bottom of Table 5. The results indicate that the relative improvement in 
forecast accuracy is greater for foreign analysts familiar with IFRS than for foreign analysts 
unfamiliar with IFRS. 
To test H3, we focus on Row B- the 184 firms followed by at least one domestic analyst 
and at least one foreign analyst familiar with IFRS. In Cells (B,2), (B,3) and (B,4), we partition 
these 184 firms into three country groups (i.e., HH, HL, and LH) based on the two country-level 
institutional characteristics: ENFORCE and M CC. Cell (B,2) shows that, for the HH group (i.e., 
firms domiciled in countries with both strong enforcement and domestic accounting standards 
that differ significantly from IFRS), mean and median DIFF_MCCURACY are both 
significantly positive (p<O.Ol, one-tailed), indicating that foreign analysts familiar with IFRS 
experience an improvement in forecast accuracy relative to domestic analysts. In contrast, Cells 
(B,3) and (B,4) show no statistically significant improvement for the other two country groups. 
To test H3, we compare DIFF_MCCURACYacross these three country groups. The results are 
shown at the bottom of Table 5. We find that both the mean and median of DIFF MCCURACY 
for the HH country group (see Cell (B,2)) are significantly greater than for either the HL group 
(see Cell (B,3)) or the LH group (see Cell (B,4)), providing support for H2. 
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In summary, the results from these within-firm analyses are consistent with our earlier 
results from our cross-sectional analyses. These results increase our confidence that our results 
are unlikely to be driven by some correlated omitted variable(s). 
6. CONCLUSION 
This study examines whether the European-wide mandatory adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (!FRS) in 2005 changed the degree of information asymmetry 
between foreign and domestic analysts. Specifically, we examine whether !FRS adoption 
improves foreign analysts' forecast accuracy relative to domestic analysts. Using a sample of 
analysts who forecasted earnings for the same set of firms in both pre- and post-adoption 
periods, we fmd no evidence of an improvement in forecast accuracy for foreign analysts relative 
to domestic analysts, on average. However, partitioning foreign analysts based on their 
familiarity with !FRS, we do find evidence that foreign analysts familiar with !FRS exhibit an 
improvement in forecast accuracy relative to domestic analysts; we find no such improvement 
for foreign analysts unfamiliar with !FRS. Further partitioning our sample firms based on 
country-level institutional factors, we find that the improvement in forecast accuracy relative to 
domestic analysts for those foreign analysts familiar with !FRS is concentrated among firms 
domiciled in countries with both domestic accounting standards that differ considerably from 
!FRS and strong enforcement regimes, i.e., where the requirements by !FRS adoption are likely 
to be both substantial and rigorously implemented. 
Our results should be of interest to policy-makers who expect mandatory !FRS adoption 
to increase cross-border investment (e.g., see EC Regulation 1601/2002; McCreevy, 2005). Our 
results provide direct evidence suggesting that mandatory !FRS adoption helps reduce 
information asymmetry between domestic and foreign market participants, which should in turn 
reduce investors' home bias and encourage cross-border investment. However, our results also 
suggest that the effect of mandatory !FRS adoption is unlikely to be uniform across investors and 
across countries. Our results highlight that both investors' familiarity with !FRS and countries' 
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enforcement environments play important roles in determining the extent to which mandatory 
!FRS adoption levels the informational playing field between foreign and domestic investors. 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Description 
# # Difference b/w Domestic Ace. Enforcement Environment 
of firms of Analysts Standards and !FRS (MCC) (ENFORCE) 
Country (l) (2) (3) (4) 
Austria l l 12 1.8 
Belgium 32 21 13 1.4 
Czech Republic l 2 14 0.7 
Denmark 27 22 ll 1.9 
Finland 30 26 15 1.9 
France 148 178 12 1.3 
Germany 23 119 ll l.7 
Greece 30 19 17 0.7 
Hungary 2 13 0.7 
Ireland 24 16 l 1.6 
Italy 83 47 12 0.5 
Luxembourg l 18 1.9 
Netherlands 41 59 4 1.7 
Norway 50 39 7 1.9 
Poland 4 2 12 0.3 
Portugal 5 l 13 l.l 
Spain 61 57 !6 l.l 
Sweden 45 62 10 1.8 
Switzerland 18 39 12 2.0 
United Kingdom 339 399 l 1.6 
Non-European Countrie/: 
Brazil ll 
Korea 6 
Malaysia I 8 
South Africa 3 0 
United States 15 l 
Total: 964 1,132 Median: ll 1.6 
Our sample consists of European-domiciled firms that switched from using domestic accounting standards to IFRS 
as a result of the mandatory European-wide adoption ofiFRS effective for fiscal years beginning on or after January 
I, 2005. We identify our sample firms using data on firms' accounting standards from both Compustat and 
Datastream/Worldsocpe. When these two databases provide conflicting information as to a firm's accounting 
standards, we hand-check firms' annual reports. Using IBES data, we identify individual analysts who forecast 
earnings for these firms in both the twO-year pre-adoption and post-adoption periods; thiS provides a constant 
analyst-firm sample. We then identify the country location of these individual analysts using both analysts' names 
and the names of analysts' brokerage firm employers. Using the brokerage house affiliations we are able to identify, 
we hand-match these analyst-broker name combinations with brokerage firm listings in Nelson's Directory of 
Investment Research for the period 2003-2006. The brokerage house listings in Nelson's Directory of Investment 
Research include the name of each individual analyst employed by a broker firm and the analyst's primary business 
location, i.e., the brokerage finn office where the analyst is based. Using this approach we are able to identify the 
primary business location of 1,132 individual analysts, approximately 40-percent of the 2,819 analysts we originally 
identify. The primary business location of these 1,132 unique analysts is listed in column (2). We partition foreign 
analysts and firms using the GAAP difference (M CC) measure from Bae et al. (2008, Table 1). We also partition 
firms using the law enforcement measure (ENFORCE) from Kaufmann et al. (2007). L1ACC measures differences 
between countries' domestic accounting standards and IFRS along 21 key accounting items; higher values of 
L1A CC indicate greater differences between domestic accounting standards and IFRS. ENFORCE is a measure of 
the quality of a country's legal and enforcement regime. Higher values of ENFORCE represent countries with 
stronger legal and enforcement regimes. 
1 A small number of analysts (21) are based in non-European countries. These non-European based analysts also 
forecast earnings for our sample European firms that are subject to mandatory IFRS adoption. We include these 
analysts in our analysis; however, our inferences are unaffected if we exclude these analysts. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics: Pre- and Post- Mandatory IFRS Adoption Periods 
Number of Observations- 4,303 
Pre-period Post-period Change Significance of 
(!) (2) (3) Change (4) 
Mean Mean Mean 2-tailed p-values: 
(Median) (Median) (Median) t-test 
[STD) [STD] [STD] Signrank 
ACCURACY -0.028 -0.017 0.011 <0.001 
(-0.012) (-0.007) (0.003) <0.001 
[0.049] [0.029] [0.043] 
ACCURACY (Domestic Analysts) -0.026 -0.017 0.011 <0.001 
(-0.011) (-0.007) (0.003) <0.001 
[0.049] [0.030] [0.047] 
ACCURACY (All Foreign Analysts) -0.030 -0.018 0.012 <0.001 
(-0.011) (-0.006) (0.004) <0.001 
[0.051] [0.025] [0.028] 
ACCURACY (Foreign Analysts -0.031 -0.015 0.014 <0.001 
Familiar with !FRS) (-0.011) (-0.006) (0.005) <0.001 
[0.055] [0.023] [0.026] 
ACCURACY (Foreign Analysts -0.030 -0.020 0.009 <0.001 
Unfamiliar with !FRS) (-0.011) (-0.007) (0.002) <0.001 
[0.045] [0.027] [0.029] 
LogFOLLOW 2.628 2.699 0.071 <0.001 
(2.792) (2.833) (0.030) <0.001 
[0.825] [0.747] [0.299] 
LogSIZE 7.150 7.579 0.429 <0.001 
(7.094) (7.603) (0.419) <0.001 
[1.793] [1.723] [0.434] 
LogHORIZON 4.954 5.027 0.073 <0.001 
(4.956) (5.036) (0.047) <0.001 
[0.417] [0.436] [0.547] 
Two-tailed p-values: 
Comparison of L1ACCURACY Across Analyst Groups t-test Ranksum test 
Domestic Analysts vs. All Foreign Analysts p~0.520 p<O.OOI 
Domestic Analysts vs. Foreign Analysts Familiar with IFRS p~O.l59 p<O.OOI 
Domestic Analysts vs. Foreign Analysts Unfamiliar with IFRS p~0.579 p~0.616 
Foreign Analysts Familiar with IFRS vs. Foreign Analysts Unfamiliar with IFRS p~O.Ol8 p<O.OOI 
We match individual analysts who forecast earnings for the same firm across the pre- and post-adoption periods. 
Similar to Duru and Reeb (2002), ACCURACYyr is a measure of the accuracy of analyst i's price-scaled absolute 
forecast error for firmj in period t, multiplied by -1, to convert to an accuracy measure, i.e., ACCURACYyr = -1 x 
( !Actua~r- Forecastyrl !Stock Pricej1), where Actualjt is actual annual EPS from the IBES database for firmj in year t; 
Forecastyr is analyst i's last forecast for firmj in year t; and Stock Pricejt is the stock price of firmj at the start of year t. 
We calculate the change in each individual analyst's average forecast accuracy (L1ACCURACY) as the difference 
between analysts i's average forecast accuracy for firmj in the pre- and post-adoption periods. LogFOLLOW is the log 
of the total number of analysts following firm j in either the pre- or post-adoption periods. This includes all analysts 
following a firm, not just the constant set of analysts who forecast in both the pre- and post-adoption periods. LogSIZE 
is (the log of) average market capitalization (in US $) for firm j in either the pre- or post-adoption periods. 
LogHORJZON is the log of the average number of days between the forecast issuance dates and the earnings 
announcement dates for analyst i's forecasts for firm j. All variables are winsorized at the 1-percent and 99-percent 
levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. All p-values are two-tailed. 
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TABLE 3 
Testing Hl: The Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Domestic 
Analysts' Local Advantage (Full Sample of All Firms) 
Coefficient Coefficient 
Prediction (p-value) (p-value) 
Intercept 0.0043 0.0043 
(0.156) (0.155) 
FOREIGN + 0.0024 
(0.156) 
FOREIGN_FAMILIAR + 0.0041 
(0.020) 
FOREIGN_ UNF AM/LIAR 0.0002 
(0.913) 
LllogSIZE 0.0150 0.0149 
(0.018) (0.018) 
LllogFOLLOW -0.0023 -0.0024 
(0.554) (0.543) 
LllogHORIZON -0.0039 -0.0039 
(0.002) (0.002) 
One-tailed p-value for testing lh > fh (0.027) 
Number of Observation 4,303 4,303 
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.025 
The dependent variable is the change in analyst i's absolute forecast error for firm} (MCCURACYij) between the 
pre- and post-adoption periods. FOREIGNy· is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if analyst i is a foreign 
(domestic) analyst with respect to firm j, i.e., analyst i is located in a different country from firm j. 
FOREIGN_FAMILIARij is a dummy variable equal to one if analyst i following firm j is a foreign analyst who is 
familiar with !FRS, i.e., she is based in a low MCC country, and zero otherwise. FOREIGN_UNFAMILIARy is a 
dummy variable equal to one if analyst i following firm} is a foreign analyst who is unfamiliar with IFRS, i.e., she is 
based in a high M CC country, and zero othetwise. The change in firm size (JLogSIZEj) is the change in the log of 
average market capitalization between the pre- and post-adoption periods for firmj; L1LogFOLLO~ is the change in 
the log of the total number of analysts following firm j between the pre- or post-adoption periods. The change in 
forecast horizon (JLogHORIZONif) is the change in the log of the average forecast horizon for analyst i's forecasts 
for firmj between the pre- to the post-adoption periods. 
t:.ACCURACYij ~ a0 +a, FOREIGN,+ a,MogSIZ~ + a,MogFOLLOWj 
+ a4!1LogHORIZO!I£ + Eij . 
LlACCURACYij = {30 + {31FOREIGN_FAMIL!Af1t+ {3 2FOREJGN_UNFAMIL!A!} 
+ {33L1LogSIZ~ + {34L1LogFOLLO~ + {35 L1LogHORIZOJt + Eij 
(I) 
(2) 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1-percent and 99-percent levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. 
We cluster on firms to correct for the inflation in standard errors due to multiple observations for the same firm. All 
reported p-values are two-tailed .. Coefficients significant at 1 0-percent or better are highlighted in bold. 
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